

anticipation and expectation

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This dark cloud that covers this juncture I am concerned with here, the one which the psychoanalyst passes to becoming a psychoanalyst - that is what our School can work at dissipating.²

Our proposition is to give an equation for this whose constant is the algebra. The psychoanalyst's desire is his enunciation, which is able to be operative only if this desire comes into the position of the x.³

[...] not all may get to the truth (*toucher au vrai*), still no one can get there but by means of the others.⁴

How might one approach the *passe* from the place of inexperience? How might one critique its principle and its effects, when at the level of such a divide (i.e. the other side of experience), its uncharted potential lends itself so readily to fantastic rumination? In 2011, I participated in a seminar of the *Freudian School of Melbourne*, and on two occasions led a discussion concerning the *passe*. This work had to be approached from the place of inexperience. I have not participated in the *passe*. The following reflections were initially based on these discussions. They constitute an approach to the *passe*, notwithstanding the irony implicit in such an endeavour, given that the *passe* was defined by Lacan as a psychoanalytic act. But is it possible to get anywhere near the *passe*, short of diving directly into the experience or pouring over the few written testimonies available to us in English? Holding this question in abeyance for now, and in the context of acknowledging the difficulty posed by any attempt at angling at the *passe*, the following is an inquiry, which considers the function of the *passe* and the status of anticipation and expectation in relation to its execution and effects.

Initially my researches were in response to feeling provoked and baffled by the implications of the *passe* as a possibility within the School of which I am a member. The opaqueness of the *passe*, in so far as it does not produce a knowledge that can be digested and appropriated, flies in the face of a culture, which currently privileges the evidence base. By necessity, its principle resists mere description or verification according to a 'right' procedure, and as such, is poised to upset the orbit of any comfortable assumptions we might harbour about psychoanalysis and how it works. For as the present inquiry developed, it became increasingly apparent that for anyone involved in the *passe*, that hypothetical place, which holds the tremor of psychoanalysis safely at a distance, would have to be traversed. In the seminar, I wanted to get nearer. I wanted to examine the principle of the *passe* without simply generating more distance by getting bogged down in the potential trappings of historical review or laboured considerations of its formal structure that emphasize logistics over logic. This is not to suggest by any means that the consequences of the implementation of the *passe* in the *École Freudienne de Paris (EFP)*, or the logic inherent to the structure of this device, ought not be taken seriously.

The present inquiry began with a question that at the time seemed impenetrable from a distance: 'Given that the undertaking of the *passe* exceeds what anyone can know of it in advance, what is it that propels an analyst to demand a candidature – to risk submitting the

intimacy of his or her analysis to the exposure of public discourse, beyond the walls of the consulting room?’ Having posed the question, I was reminded of a paper written by Jean Allouch, *Paranoïisation: Simple Indication of the Direction of the Cure*. In it, Allouch invites his reader, whom he addresses as an analysand, to nominate what he believes initially prompted him to consult a psychoanalyst.⁵ Further to this, he questions what it is that sustains the analysand’s regular return to the consulting room. Before revealing his hand, Allouch rules out any likelihood that his reader’s reasons are going to concur with what he is about to tell him. The path to the analyst’s door, he contends, is initiated through a hearsay (“*ouï-dire*”): “that which one knows by the report of another person”.⁶ This element of psychoanalytic hearsay pertains to a particular type of knowing that has nothing to do with what the subject already knows, or thinks he might know, about psychoanalysis, when he knocks upon a psychoanalyst’s door for the first time.

If what I have just written constitutes a spoiler, my apologies go to Allouch, but this should not detract from the paper’s impression on the reader. I want to draw attention to one of its premises, which forcibly dispels a broadly held understanding (therefore a misunderstanding) – that is, that psychoanalysis is a knowledge-based practice. For if we concur with Allouch’s premise of the hearsay, it follows that the function, psychoanalyst, is not an effect of knowledge but an effect of discourse. Lacan identified this effect as a function of the desire that the speech of the psychoanalyst embodies – a function that maintains its direction according to the limits of rational knowledge in the language of a common sense. Allouch notes that in passing from one ear to another, an effect of speech seizes the analysand in the transference manifesting in the form of a paranoia. What is surprising is the fact that the neurotic who finds himself in this position consents to it. That is, he consents to something he hears, and does not understand, making his *ouï*, a *oui*, by implicitly placing his trust in it. Allouch associates this effect with a paranoiac disposition in so far as the subject-to-a-hearsay conforms his *ouï-dire* to the co-ordinates of a delusion, entering into the “discourse of the interpreter”:

For the analysand, as for the interpreter, the interpretation is characterized in being literal: its validity is established not according to sense, but to the letter, a sense only being momentarily stabilized by virtue of the support of a literal operation.⁷

In the seminar of 1960/1961, Lacan maintains that the subject in transference is effectively deluded in his love, in so far as he imputes a truth-value to an other, and constitutes his object under the veil of the image of truth. What the lover fails to obtain from the object narcissistically then, maintains a relation with the subject’s suffering and his frustration in relation to the semblant of a dissatisfied desire. And it is the psychoanalyst, in so far as he is supposed to that place, who is implicated in that suffering and the analysand’s associated demand. It is in relation to a real object outside the field of representation however, that the transference unfolds and sustains its force in the analysis from beginning to end. According to Lacan, what the analyst must reckon with decisively at the conclusion of his analysis is precisely this Real. In the *Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School*, Lacan states that, “[...] there is a real at stake in the very training of psychoanalysts. We hold that existing societies be founded on this real. [...] this real provokes its own miscognition, indeed produces its systematic negation”.⁸

Now, if what has been proposed thus far is not misguided, then perhaps an element of the hearsay that bears a relation to this Real is at stake at the inception of the analysis, and also its end, and it is the end of the analysis that the *passé* attempts in some way to formalize. What we have ascertained so far would appear to situate a dimension of paranoia at the forefront of

our concerns in relation to something invariably misrecognised. And if we are not in error in assuming that at the end of the analysis the analysand is at the point of abandoning his delusion, the advent of the *passé* raises the question of what this strange arrangement might facilitate beyond the analysis, and what moves the analyst to give a testimony of his experience. Clearly there is a difference between the effects of a hearsay that inaugurates the transference and where the analyst might be placed in relation to it after leaving the analysis. It is nevertheless a curious thing that the device of the *passé*, according to the way Lacan proposed it, contrives the structure of a hearsay in the function of the *passés*. Like denuded muses, they stand in at the point at which the object of desire is no longer coincidental with the analyst in the transference. Lending their ears to the *passant*, the *passé*'s sole function is to listen *without interpreting*, and to convey what was heard of the analyst's testimony to the Analysts of the School appointed to the task. This would suggest that the *passé* puts to the test the effects of a shift in the discourse of the analyst, from the discourse of the interpreter (marked by a paranoia) to the discourse of the psychoanalyst (marked by a non-interpretable desire).

If we return to Allouch's question regarding the catalyst of the analysis at the outset, it serves as a reminder of the force of the transference in an analysis. By 1967, Lacan was privileging use of the term supposition over that of transference in disputation of the connotation of intersubjectivity associated with the latter:

A subject supposes nothing, he is supposed. Supposed I teach, by the signifier that represents him for another signifier [...] it can only unfold by the third constituent, which is the signifier introduced into the discourse that thereby establishes itself.⁹

Lacan's formulation of transference as a supposition and Allouch's proposal of the hearsay (with the coordinates of a paranoid knowledge, not necessarily psychotic), both define the subject of the unconscious as a structure of discourse produced by the analysis. Lacan's "third constituent" refers to the situation of the subject in the signifying chain in which he is invariably caught. And it is a signifying effect of language, productive of the symptom at the limits of representative knowledge, which takes hold as a supposition, and is construed in the extrapolation of the analysand's fantasm. In reference to our question concerning the *passé*, we are then left to wonder what becomes of this supposition when the analyst no longer functions as its host, having disappeared, according to Lacan, "like dung".¹⁰ What becomes of the object of the fantasy when the analyst has been effectively stripped of this suppositional function?

Borne of the impasses Freud reached in relation to this question and the difficulties he encountered in determining a definitive end to the analysis, his description of psychoanalysis as interminable left the problem of the remainder of the transference suspended. It was a problem disowned by the next generation of analysts, the majority of who conceptualized the transference as a specular relation that was resolved or dissolved at the end of the analytic sessions.¹¹ According to Moustafa Safouan, training candidates affiliated with the International Psychoanalytic Association were for this reason selected according to personal qualities considered amenable to a capacity for 'reality testing', and were authorized as training analysts on the basis of a professional code that lacked consistency across the associations. The rationales attached to these criteria were contradictory and typically replete with moral expectations.¹² Contrary to this, Lacan's 1967 proposition put the question of what was at stake at the conclusion of an analysis squarely back on the table.¹³

In 1967, Lacan drew attention to the silence surrounding the end of the analysis, a problem that he held responsible for perpetuating the ruse of the professional charlatan. His invention of the *passe* was proposed as a structure that would break that silence and pose a limit to the type of administrative governance that cultivates in the training of analysts, rites of association and initiation under the hermetic seal of the institution. In *Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956*, Lacan satirized this theatre of organized repression to the hilt.¹⁴ He brought his audience's attention to the effects of a didactic style of training, which, in adhering to the ideal of a know-how, generates identifications and rivalries characteristic of the group, such that it demands this sort of governance. Psychoanalysis is nonetheless predicated on a given, which is always at risk of being obfuscated in relation to psychoanalysis, that is, that psychoanalysis is a discourse tied to the Real of the act – an act that as a gaffe, excludes the practice of psychoanalysis from qualification as a profession. Thus the only valid aggregate of psychoanalysts is a School comprised of disparate others, marked by the singularity of a symptom. This holds because psychoanalysis proper maintains a response to transference in working it from that singular place, which insists in the Real of the symptom, and which the analyst keeps intact. For this reason, the nomination of the desire of the psychoanalyst is not conferred by the nomination of a title. It is a form of nomination in which the impossible to bear, the impossible to teach, the impossible to name, insists upon a speaking that does not pass the remainder of the transference over to silence.

The opportunity of the *passe* – if we conceptualize it as an opportunity not reducible to the demands of the institution, and as a possible enactment of the discourse of the psychoanalyst reliant on a hearsay – clearly rules out as invalid any expectation that the *passe* will provide a measure of proof regarding the end of the analysis, or that it will, by default, produce psychoanalysts. If this is correct, then the function of a testimony at the end of the analysis would only be recognizable according to its effects, and it clearly follows that the same principle applies to the analyst in so far as he is responsible for sustaining those effects. In this regard, the *passe* might be conceptualized as an opportunity linked to the necessity of a speaking, which, at the limits of the discourse of the sessions, conclusively passes over to the discourse of the psychoanalyst.

In *Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School*, Lacan openly declared his investment in the *passe* as a means to dispel the mystery surrounding what happens at the end of the analyst's analysis – a mystery associated with the authorization of analysts, which had become burdened with controversy, politics and confusion in the majority of the training institutes. As a first principle Lacan maintained that the authorization of the analyst is only derived from the place of the analyst's desire, thus situating responsibility for the end of the analysis beyond the confines of the training analyst's judgment and the demands of the group. This was to acknowledge that the function of the psychoanalyst is determined, not by a protocol, but to the extent that his word corresponds with his act, an act only recognisable by others, in accordance with its effects. Thus, in so far as the discourse of a psychoanalyst is authorized, his function takes effect as a work of transmission, which might be acknowledged by analysts and analysands alike in the absence of any metalanguage or status conferred by the Other. Despite this, Lacan's unequivocal stance regarding the authorization of the analyst had seismic effects when he first proposed it as "decisive" for the functioning of a school.¹⁵

Lacan's statement, if it was decisive at the time, is no less peremptory for any School active in the training of psychoanalysts today. Although his words have since been anodized and distorted by a morass of popular exposure, the principle of 'self-authorization' still holds and remains crucial to any serious analysis of the function of the *passe*. Lacan's emphasis upon

the transmission of psychoanalysis, and its dependence on the supposition of the analysand, would suggest that the discourse of the psychoanalyst will only be maintained in so far as those carrying that supposition remain capable of seeing the transference of the analysis through to its conclusion. The principle of the authorization of the psychoanalyst, as derived only from his act, and which clearly has nothing to do with a 'self', takes its direction from a desire that resists conforming the analyst's function to the concept and ideal form of the psychoanalyst. What then might be anticipated in the *passee* is the testimony of an encounter, which via the structure of the hearsay, de-supposes a subject in allowing the object to pass. In his later seminars, Lacan refers to a surplus, a fragment of *jouissance* that passes over, as a form of writing:

It is a matter then of making tangible how the transmission of a letter has a relationship with something essential, fundamental in the organization of discourse whatever it may be, namely, enjoyment.¹⁶

The *passee* has been undertaken in the *Freudian School of Melbourne: School of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* on several occasions and in different ways. In the *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, two analysts have attested to this experience and its effects.¹⁷ The way it was undertaken and what was produced was clearly different in each case, and this difference seems to reflect a form of discontinuity, which Lacan claimed, is brought into effect by the desire of the psychoanalyst. This may be why the enunciation of the *passee* cannot be discovered in any blue print formula fantastically passed down to us from the EFP, ready for replication. In the *Freudian School of Melbourne* the opportunity of the *passee* is not given according to a fixed set of predetermined formal arrangements, but rather, has been taken up in a variety of different ways.

The history of psychoanalysis has shown that when the nomination of the psychoanalyst becomes identified with a title authorized by a master or ideal administration, the discourse surrounding the training of psychoanalysts is typically beset by the effects of the group. These effects, characterised by paranoia and identification, conform to a form of *jouissance* typical of the group that cannot tolerate difference, and which looks to a master to regulate it. Neither Freud nor Lacan were immune to the effects of the group and each made mistakes in their efforts to intervene in it. Despite this, neither tired of insisting, that one of the principal functions of the discourse of the psychoanalyst is precisely that of limiting group effects. For both were at pains to show, and in different ways, that it is the discourse of the psychoanalyst that is better positioned than any other to critique the effects of the group. The genesis of this critique is traceable to Freud's 1921 paper: *Group Psychology and The Analysis of the Ego*:

What appears later on in society in the shape of *Gemeingeist*, *esprit de corps*, 'group spirit', etc., does not belie its derivation from what was originally envy. No one must want to put himself forward, every one must be the same and have the same.¹⁸

In 1956, Lacan noted that in 1921 Freud came close to rendering the fascist organizations that were later to take prominence, with his "fundamental discovery of the identification of each individual's ego with the same ideal image, the mirage of which is borne by the personality of the leader."¹⁹ In 1967, Lacan's *Proposition* was specifically focused on the question of what can sustain a School differently according to its *function*, a function he defined as the transmission of psychoanalysis and the training of psychoanalysts. Within that context, the *passee* was tabled as an experiment that he anticipated would pose a limit to the potential pitfalls of *Gemeingeist* and which, in dispelling the myth surrounding psychoanalysis, would open the discourse of psychoanalysis to renovation by other discourses (i.e. psychoanalysis in

extension). Thus, Lacan states that “everything is summed up in the function of our School in so far as it presents psychoanalysis to the world, and psychoanalysis in intension, i.e. training in so far as it does not only prepare operators”.²⁰ In this context, the *passé* was proposed as a structure that would facilitate the transmission of psychoanalysis, thereby supporting the training of analysts (essential to the work of transmission), and at the same time, dismantling the mystery surrounding what the analyst’s analysis produces.

Elisabeth Roudinesco, in *Jacques Lacan & Co: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985*, refers to the experiment of the *passé* in the EFP during the 1970’s as a failure.²¹ Moustafa Safouan’s critique, *The Question of the Training of Psychoanalysts*, which is not limited to the same type of historical analysis of the *passé*, does not arrive at the same conclusion.²² As an analyst member of the EFP from its beginnings, Safouan was involved in procedures of the *passé* within that School. Commenting on the effects of its implementation, and in the context of the disbanding of the EFP, he cautions his reader against leaping to erroneous assumptions, noting that “if the failure of the School is the failure of the *passé*, it does not mean that this failure is the cause of the first”.²³ Safouan attributes a tendency to misconstrue the significance of events in the EFP to a legacy that was perpetuated in the aftermath of its collapse, buoyed by the effects of Lacan’s absence. The response of many to his death, he suggests, involved the attenuation of an imaginary transference to the ‘personage’ of Lacan in lieu of continuing the work he left unfinished. Transference to psychoanalysis does not adjourn with the death of any principal innovator and Safouan notes that when this happens, there is a gross form of identification with all the trappings of a nostalgia. In *The Question of the Training of Psychoanalysts*, he returns his reader to the inception of psychoanalytic transference that began with the transference of, and to, Freud, noting the effect that Freud’s illness and death had on the development of the training of psychoanalysts when it became coloured by just such a nostalgia. Referencing a critique by Sigfried Bernfield in 1950 with regard to the training of psychoanalysts in the United States, Safouan notes that in response to Freud’s diagnosis of cancer and his unexpected recovery following an initially bleak prognosis, it was observed that “some [analysts] grew intensely anxious because of the threatened loss and very eager to establish a solid dam against heterodoxy, as they now felt themselves *responsible for the future of psychoanalysis*”.²⁴ This type of reaction, he suggests, is a defensive form of acting out, “that forbids all and everyone a certain idea of jouissance, and which the position of the master ‘would promise’”.²⁵

The effects of Lacan’s physical decline, which coincided with the final years of the EFP and his death shortly after its dissolution, seem to warrant some consideration given the above. Moreover, former members of the EFP, including Lacan, acknowledged that the School was no longer functioning effectively towards its end. Of more immediate concern however, is the question of how psychoanalysts might elect to respond to these events, whether something can be learnt from them beyond apportionings of cause or blame, and whether there is room for psychoanalysts, post-Lacan, to continue reinventing the *passé* beyond his image. The undertaking of the *passé* today, which is widespread, leaves the question open, *après coup* of Lacan’s investment in it, with regard to the function of the analysand’s testimony and what can effectively support it. In addition, it poses the question of how the effects of the testimony of the *passé* can be effectively divorced from the imaginary and idealizing tendencies historically associated with grades and titles conferred upon ‘senior’ analysts. These are crucial questions for any School nominating itself today as ‘Lacanian’.

At this point in our inquiry, however, the question of what moves the analyst to testify to the experience of his analysis has not been adequately addressed. A logical approach to tackling this question can perhaps be traced as far back as 1945. Lacan’s paper, *Logical Time and the*

Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism was written 22 years before the proposition of 1967, yet perhaps it can be read, in part, as a premonitory preamble to the logic underpinning his formulation of the *passee*.

In *Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism*, Lacan presents the reader with a logical problem that takes the form of a hypothetical (a scenario involving three prisoners). A warden with three white discs and two black discs in hand, informs the prisoners that one of these five discs will be placed in the small of each of the inmate's backs. They are forbidden to speak or gesture to one another. They are informed that whoever is capable of exiting, and correctly attesting to the colour with which he is marked, will be awarded his freedom, but on the proviso that he is capable of giving valid reasons for his conclusion. Lacan's point of reference is the status of the solution that is accepted as valid, and in particular, a non-classical (i.e. non-spatial) form of logic, which he claims is overlooked in the prisoner's testimony. The prisoner's reasons are flawed, he argues, in failing to take account of a temporal logic – a logic that he seems to infer as being parallel to the logical time of the signifier in analytic discourse. Whereas much can be taken from this paper, it is Lacan's theory of *anticipated certainty*, which is the principal concern here with regard to the opportunity of the *passee*.

In his analysis of the problem, Lacan notes that the deductions of the prisoner who concludes without simply mimicking his peers would have to be predicated with an *assertion of truth* (i.e. a statement of anticipated certainty). This form of knowing apprehension is represented in the prisoner's first assertion, "I am white", demonstrating the alienating force of language, which in inhabiting the subject, gives him the status of a conjectural being. Thus, the prisoner's assertion, "I am white", although an imaginary proposition, constitutes the necessary premise for a logical approach to his situation. Having made this assertion, the subject's knowledge is now occluded by a 'blind spot', instituted by the warden's prohibition, and he is then only in a position to test out the truth of his situation in relation to his fellow inmates. In being captivated by the question of what the other sees, however, he remains alienated in his assertion, subject to a form of specular deduction characterized by doubt – a doubt that he begins to test out by imputing his thoughts to his "semblable" others.²⁶ These cogitations develop to a point that Lacan identifies as, "the moment of understanding" in which the prisoner decides: 'the others must not see that I am black, as neither has made a move'. However, as there is nothing outside the field of his imaginary imputations to convince him of the truth of his situation, this thinking reaches an impasse. It is only in the act of concluding, in taking the risk of putting what he does not know to the test, that a third constituent intervenes. Lacan claims that the prisoner's encounter with this third constituent, which manifests as a "moment of suspension" (in which all three prisoners pause and glance at one another in the midst of their advance upon the exit) is a definitive logical moment:

The '*I*', subject of the conclusive assertion, is isolated from the other – that is, from the relation of reciprocity – by a logical *beat* [*battement de temps*]. This movement of the logical genesis of the '*I*' through a decanting of its own logical time largely parallels its psychological birth.²⁷

Lacan is intent on demonstrating the effect of a temporal logic that he suggests is intrinsic to the haste of the act, and which can only be comprehended following its execution.²⁸ The conclusion of prisoner A is precipitated by the moment of suspension, in which all three prisoners hesitate – and it is a discontinuity in the imaginary that gives the subject access to the symbolic (i.e. 'we are all in doubt'). Thus this moment of the glance functions as a sign, *indicating what is missing* (i.e. the black discs) in relation to what is concealed and unassailable (the white disc on his back). On this basis prisoner A is only in a position to

conclude that he is *not*, not white, (as logically distinct from ‘I am white’). Unable to be certain, he must proceed in the aperture of the moment to test out this limit, for as Lacan points out, were he to lag behind the others, the opportunity to conclude would be absorbed again in a drift of further speculation. Thus, in this state of temporal momentum the subject must make do with what he has, both in step, and out of step, with his counterparts.

Now it would be erroneous to take things too far by way of analogy. It is the logic that Lacan toys with in this analysis that is relevant to our purpose. In relation to this logic, Lacan maintains that the proper solution demonstrates “all the constraining rigor of a logical process”, which “exposes the process of verification in the very act, in which each of the subjects manifests that it has led him to his conclusion”.²⁹ Notably, in relation to this observation, his invention of the *passé* is proposed twenty-two years later as a testimonial act capable of conclusively articulating the end of the analyst’s analysis. Something appears to return in the *passé* from 1945, which is defined there as a moment of radical discontinuity. In Lacan’s proposal of 1967, it is reformulated as a missed encounter, in which the fantasy of the analysand collapses and the object of the analysis falls.³⁰ Lacan’s theory of logical time seems to suggest that it would be a moment of haste, replete with angst, which might precipitate an act of conclusion. This is borne out in some of the written testimonies of the *passé* to which those who read English have access. In her paper, for instance, Linda Clifton writes of an urgency to put something that remained unarticulated at the end of the analytic sessions into words, and which thinking and further speculation seemed to defy:

The uncovering of the fantasm certainly brought matters to a close in the analysis. It seemed to cast a net over the whole analysis and there was an immediate subjective effect of recognition and relief. However this was short-lived and was followed by a gradually dawning horror and angst at what had been revealed. How could this be mine? [...] My internal protest of “how could this be mine?” became a question I wanted to pursue using the psychoanalytic method.³¹

Shortly after the announcement of the disbanding of the EFP was announced, in an address made on January 1980, Lacan stated: “I expect nothing from individuals, and something from a functioning”.³² In other words, he had expected more from the discourse of the psychoanalyst than the dictum of some psychoanalysts. Irrespective of whether this statement was drafted by Lacan or not, something had clearly ceased to function in the discourse of the EFP, something that had earlier been nominated as the responsibility of the analysts of the School and the School’s capacity for transmission and extension. In 1967, Lacan had directed his expectations of the *passé* to those analysts whom he “characterized as being among those [...] able to testify to crucial problems”, this being further elaborated in the idea that the *passé* could contribute to establishing “that the School can guarantee the analyst’s relationship to the training that it provides”.³³

There appears to be a contradiction between Lacan’s 1967 statement in which he ties the discourse of the psychoanalyst to a nomination, and that nomination to a guarantee, and the anticipatory logic mapped out in 1945. Given he had proposed the desire of the psychoanalyst in 1945 as a logically defined *moment*, it raises the question as to why he felt it necessary to introduce the *gradus*, A.S. (Analyst of the School). The formality of titles had historically been misconstrued as nominations of prestige and entitlement. What then, was to prevent the *gradus* A.S. from becoming associated with any number of expectations, including the imaginary demands of the School, those of Lacan himself, or even a guarantee for the future of psychoanalysis? The nomination, psychoanalyst, or A.S., I would argue, cannot guarantee anything, any more than a School can guarantee the work of a psychoanalyst beyond its transitory effects. The act of nomination, as Lacan defined it logically, is particular to a

nomination, which, as psychoanalytic writing, broaches a nomination of the impossible to name. If the transmission of psychoanalysis is dependent upon the discourse of a School to the extent that the latter supports an analyst to assume that proper function, this refers us to its basis, which we might define as the anticipated certainty of the analysand. In so far as a School provides a structure, it can support but cannot guarantee the psychoanalyst's function at any given time. It is worth acknowledging here that the 'mature' analyst in relation to his peers and the work he engages in with them is often in the position of analysand. Also, that it is in this context that, time and again, the discourse of the psychoanalyst passes in every work of a School that functions as a work of transmission. It follows that it is only this work that produces the difference necessary for sustaining the function, psychoanalyst.

Thus I am proposing that the conclusion of the analysis, as articulated by Lacan and others testifying to its terminal status, would be precipitated by a form of logical anticipation, characterized by angst and denuded of all expectation. In *Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty*, Lacan refers to a moment in which the subject is destitute to the utmost, and, in his 1967 *Proposition*, to a shift coincidental with the unveiling of the fantasm in which "the foothold of desire is nothing but that of a *"dèsêtre disbeing"*.³⁴ If it can be said that this is what the *passé* potentially realizes, that is, a type of 'zero degree' of desire, then the possibility of the *passé* within a School might be understood as harnessing an anticipatory logic capable of returning that surplus of the analysis to the discourse of the psychoanalyst. This is a form of nomination at a maximum distance from the desire of the Other, the expectation of others, and any letters conferring the status of a fixed or hierarchical position.

In approaching the *passé* from the side of inexperience, something that Lacan considered singular to the subversion of the subject, that is, a "discontinuity in the real", insisted in the present inquiry.³⁵ It began on the side of inexperience, and perhaps to an extent, also ends there as well, for is not every act of transmission articulated from the place of inexperience, that is, from the place of an anticipatory desire that holds a relation to the impossible? Lacan suggested that it is at the point of an encounter with the unnameable that the desire of the psychoanalyst passes over to a form of writing that reinforces the status of a non-knowledge in relation to truth. The question of how the remainder of the symptom is tied to the analyst's *jouissance*, in relation to hope and angst following the end of the analysis, was taken up in Lacan's invention of the *passé*.

In the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, the term "expectation" is associated with inheritance, morality, and assurance, whereas the term "anticipation" is defined as a precipitant act associated with something probable.³⁶ What the history of psychoanalysis has shown is that when expectations become the corollary of ideals, this invariably leads to repression and disappointment. In taking the liberty of dissociating the two terms, anticipation and expectation, I have divided them according to the two types of logic, as differentiated by Lacan in his paper *Logical Time*, placing expectation on the side of imaginary hope (bound by spatial time), and anticipation on the side of a logic (articulated by the times of the signifier). This would suggest that the idea of the analyst as 'experienced' is replete with the consistency of imaginary expectation, whereas something insists at the level of the symbolic, which only anticipation can call upon from the side of non-knowledge. Furthermore, that these two plains of subjectivity would remain circular without the intervention a third, radically discontinuous element – the encounter with an inevitably missing term.

Despite having had his eyes wide open to what can go awry when a collective of psychoanalysts converge on a task, Lacan wrote in the *Letter of Dissolution* that he was disappointing himself in dissolving the EFP.³⁷ Due to Lacan's frailty at the time, many who

were close to him became suspicious regarding the authorship of this letter. The fact that Lacan died shortly after making this address in which the prospect of founding another school was raised, was perhaps cruelly ironic in the sense that this dissolution was more or less staged as Lacan's responsibility. The result was that the continuation of the work of the School lay open to being misconstrued as incomplete by his leaving, implying that his position needed to be filled rather than mourned as a loss that left a surplus of work unfinished. According to Safouan, the *passé* was anticipated, contrary to any idea of dissolution of the transference being possible, as a means of testifying to a remainder. The advent of the *passé* for both a school and the members who elect to take it seriously, anticipates a discourse in which the psychoanalytic act is knotted to the singular – a jouissance of the letter in which the desire of the analyst takes the position of an 'x'. Whereas the articulation of the *passé* supports and reflects the functioning of a School, only the discourse of the psychoanalyst, as opposed to the administrations of a School, can support this functioning. As the momentum of a discourse can readily err on the side of expectation drained by the preoccupations of the group, the significance of the *passé* as a *function of the discourse of the psychoanalyst*, maintains its relevance and urgency in the work of any School nominating itself today as psychoanalytic.

Notes

- ¹ Member of the School, *The Freudian School of Melbourne, School of Lacanian Psychoanalysis*.
- ² Lacan, Jacques. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School". Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 8.
- ³ Lacan, Jacques. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School". Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 7.
- ⁴ Lacan, Jacques. "Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism". *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006: 161-175, 173.
- ⁵ Allouch, Jean. "Paranoïisation – Simple Indication of the Direction of the Cure". *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1988): 129-152.
- ⁶ "I am telling you that if you found yourself in psychoanalysis one day, it was for this reason: that you had heard of psychoanalysis". Allouch, Jean. "Paranoïisation: simple indication of the direction of the cure". *Lacan Love: Melbourne Seminars and Other Works*. Eds. Maria-Ines Rotmiller de Zentner, Oscar Zentner. Tr. Carolyn Henshaw. New South Wales: Bookbound: 129-152, 131.
- ⁷ Allouch, Jean. "Paranoïisation: simple indication of the direction of the cure". *Lacan Love: Melbourne Seminars and Other Works*. Eds. Maria-Ines Rotmiller de Zentner, Oscar Zentner. Tr. Carolyn Henshaw. New South Wales: Bookbound: 129-152, 138.
- ⁸ Lacan, Jacques. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School". Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 2.
- ⁹ Lacan, Jacques. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School". Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 5.
- ¹⁰ Lacan, Jacques. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School". Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 9.
- ¹¹ "Liquidation of the transference – an expression which has no other function, according to Lacan, but to conceal the desire of the analyst". Safouan, Moustoufa. "Jacques Lacan and the question of the training of analysts". *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: Clinical Psychoanalyses and the Training of Analysts*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1984): 157-228, 206f.
- ¹² "In a word, by institutionalizing psychoanalysis, it was precisely as if psychoanalysis never existed [...] a total lack of invention was displayed, since the void left by Freud had become a "place" falsely and neurotically prohibited." Safouan, Moustoufa. "Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts". *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: Clinical Psychoanalyses and the Training of Analysts*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1984): 157-228, 166.

- ¹³ In *Founding Act*, Lacan identifies transference as essential to the transmission of psychoanalysis: “The teaching of psychoanalysis can be transmitted from one subject to another only by way of transference”. Lacan, Jacques. *Television*. Ed. Joan Copjec. Tr. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990, 97-107, 103.
- ¹⁴ Lacan, Jacques. “The situation of psychoanalysis and the training of psychoanalysts in 1956”. *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. W. W. Norton, 2006: 384-411.
- ¹⁵ In an English translation of *The Proposition*, which has circulated widely, Lacan’s statement is translated as follows: “First, a principle: the psychoanalyst derives his authorization only from himself. This principle is inscribed in the original texts of the School and is decisive for its position”. Lacan, Jacques. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School”. Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 1.
- ¹⁶ Lacan, Jacques. *On a discourse that might not be a semblance. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. XVIII*. Tr. Cormac Gallagher. Unpublished manuscript, 19.5.71.
- ¹⁷ See Clifton, Linda. “The war is over: the end of an analysis”. *The Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: On Transference*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1987): 51- 56. Also, Hopper, Jane. “The battle of the sexes or the shame of trying to fake the impossible”. *The Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*. 20 Ed. David Pereira (1999): 131-136.
- ¹⁸ Freud, Sigmund. “Group Psychology and The analysis of the Ego”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Vol. XVIII. Ed. Anna Freud. Tr. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1955, 67-134, 120.
- ¹⁹ Lacan, Jacques. “The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956”. *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. W. W. Norton, 2006: 384-411, 397.
- ²⁰ Lacan, Jacques. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School”. Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 3.
- ²¹ “Invented by Lacan, la passé could not work without him, but with him it could not work either [...] the “failed” procedure would have effects that were both regenerative and disastrous on the Lacanian movement. A net result of failure can thus offer a kind of negative testimony of a certain success.” Quoted from Roudinesco, Elisabeth. *Jacques Lacan & Co: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985*. Tr. Jeffrey Mehlman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, 464.
- ²² “[...] we can say that for the E.F.P., for its part, was at least given a structure which allowed it to draw out the inferences of a failure, instead of sinking into it”. Safouan, Moustoufa. “Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts”. *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: Clinical Psychoanalyses and the Training of Analysts*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1984): 157-228, 158.
- ²³ Safouan, Moustoufa. “Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts”. *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: Clinical Psychoanalyses and the Training of Analysts*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1984): 157-228, 145.
- ²⁴ This quote by Bernfield is reproduced in, Safouan, Moustoufa. “Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts”. *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: Clinical Psychoanalyses and the Training of Analysts*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1984): 157-228, 165. Emphasis added by the author. Siegfried Bernfield’s lecture can be sourced in *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* (1962): 453-482.
- ²⁵ Safouan, Moustoufa. “Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts”. *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: Clinical Psychoanalyses and the Training of Analysts*. Ed. Oscar Zentner (1984): 157-228, 166.
- ²⁶ Lacan, Jacques. “Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty”. *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. W. W. Norton, 2006: 161-175, 168.
- ²⁷ Lacan, Jacques. “Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty”. *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. W. W. Norton, 2006: 161-175, 170.
- ²⁸ In the “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, Lacan writes, “The scansion of logical time includes what I have called the moment for understanding, the moment, precisely, of the effect produced by non-understanding”. Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 9.
- ²⁹ Lacan, Jacques. “Logical time and the assertion of anticipated certainty”. *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. W. W. Norton, 2006: 161-175, 165

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- ³⁰ “[...] the psychoanalyst no longer has to expect a look, but sees himself become a voice.” Lacan, Jacques. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School”. Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 8.
- ³¹ Clifton, Linda. “The war is over: the end of an analysis”. *The Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: On Transference*. Ed. Oscar Zentner. (1987): 51- 56, 51f.
- ³² This quote is taken from an English translation of the text, “The Other is Missing”. According to Elizabeth Roudinesco, colleagues who were close to Lacan at the time have questioned whether it was Lacan who was really the one responsible for writing these documents, as he was seriously ill at the time. See Roudinesco, Elizabeth. “Tomb for a pharaoh”. *Jacques Lacan*. Tr. Barbara Bray. New York: Columbia University Press. Lacan, Jacques. “The Other is missing”. *Television: A challenge to the psychoanalytic establishment*. Ed. Joan Copjec. Tr. Denis Holllier, Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990: 133-135, 133.
- ³³ Lacan, Jacques. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School”. Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 1.
- ³⁴ Lacan, Jacques. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School”. Tr. Russell Grigg. *Analysis No.6*. Melbourne: Centre for Psychoanalytic Research (1995): 1-13, 7.
- ³⁵ Lacan, Jacques. “The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire.” *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. New York/London: W. Norton, 2006: 671-702, 678.
- ³⁶ *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*. Ed. Judy Pearsall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- ³⁷ The following words have been attributed to Lacan: “I speak without the slightest hope – specifically of making myself understood [...] I resolve myself to it since it would function, were I not to put myself in its way [...] That is why I am dissolving”. Lacan, Jacques. “Letter of Dissolution”. *Television: A challenge to the psychoanalytic establishment*. Ed. Joan Copjec. Tr. Denis Holllier, Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990: 129-131, 129f.